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Abstract—Guaranteeing a certain level of user privacy in an
arbitrary piece of text is a challenging issue. However, with this
challenge comes the potential of unlocking access to vast data
stores for training machine learning models and supporting data
driven decisions. We address this problem through the lens of dχ-
privacy, a generalization of Differential Privacy to non Hamming
distance metrics. In this work, we explore word representations
in Hyperbolic space as a means of preserving privacy in text.
We provide a proof satisfying dχ-privacy, then we define a
probability distribution in Hyperbolic space and describe a way
to sample from it in high dimensions. Privacy is provided by
perturbing vector representations of words in high dimensional
Hyperbolic space to obtain a semantic generalization. We conduct
a series of experiments to demonstrate the tradeoff between
privacy and utility. Our privacy experiments illustrate protections
against an authorship attribution algorithm while our utility
experiments highlight the minimal impact of our perturbations
on several downstream machine learning models. Compared to
the Euclidean baseline, we observe > 20x greater guarantees on
expected privacy against comparable worst case statistics.
Index Terms—privacy; document redaction; data sanitization
I. INTRODUCTION
In Machine Learning (ML) tasks and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) systems, training data often consists of information col-
lected from users. This data can be sensitive; for example,
in conversational systems, a user can explicitly or implicitly
disclose their identity or some personal preference during their
voice interactions. Explicit personally identifiable information
(PII) (such as an individual’s PIN or SSN) can potentially be
filtered out via rules or pattern matching. However, more subtle
privacy attacks occur when seemingly innocuous information
is used to discern the private details of an individual [1].
This can lead to a number of attack vectors – ranging from
human annotators making deductions on user queries [2] to
membership inference attacks being launched against machine
learning models that were trained on such data [3]. As a result,
privacy-preserving analysis has increasingly been studied in
statistics, machine learning and data mining [4], [5] to build
systems that provide better privacy guarantees.
Of particular interest are these implicit, subtle privacy
breaches which occur as a result of an adversary’s ability to
leverage observable patterns in the user’s data. These tracing
attacks have been described to be akin to ‘fingerprinting’ [6]
due to their ability to identify the presence of a user’s data in
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the absence of explicit PII values. The work by [7] demon-
strates how to carry out such tracing attacks on ML models by
determining if a user’s data was used to train the model. These
all go to illustrate that the traditional notion of PII which is
used to build anonymization systems is fundamentally flawed
[8]. Essentially, any part of a user’s information can be used
to launch these attacks, and we are therefore in a post-PII
era [1]. This effect is more pronounced in naturally generated
text as opposed to statistical data where techniques such as
Differential Privacy (DP) have been established as a de facto
way to mitigate these attacks.
While providing quantifiable privacy guarantees over a
user’s textual data has attracted recent attention [9], [10],
there is significantly more research into privacy-preserving
statistical analysis. In addition, most of the text-based ap-
proaches have focused on providing protections over vectors,
hashes and counts [11], [12]. The question remains: what
quantifiable guarantees can we provide over the actual text?
We seek to answer that question by adopting the notion of
dχ-privacy [13]–[15], an adaptation of Local DP (LDP) [16]
which was designed for providing privacy guarantees over
location data. dχ-privacy generalizes DP beyond Hamming
distances to include Euclidean, Manhattan and Chebyshev
metrics, among others. In this work, we demonstrate the utility
of the Hyperbolic distance for dχ-privacy in the context of
textual data. This is motivated by the ability to better encode
hierarchical and semantic information in Hyperbolic space
than in Euclidean space [17]–[19].
At a high level, our algorithm preserves privacy by pro-
viding plausible deniability [20] over the contents of a user’s
query. We achieve this by transforming selected words to a
high dimensional vector representation in Hyperbolic space as
defined by Poincare´ word embeddings [18]. We then perturb
the vector by sampling noise from the same Hyperbolic space
with the amount of added noise being proportional to the
privacy guarantee. This is followed by a post-processing step
of discretization where the noisy vector is mapped to the
closest word in the embedding vocabulary. This algorithm
conforms to the dχ-privacy model introduced by [13] with our
transformations carried out in higher dimensions, in a different
metric space, and within a different domain. To understand
why this technique preserves privacy, we describe motivating
examples in Sec. II-A and define how we quantify privacy loss
by using a series of interpretable proxy statistics in Sec. VI.
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A. Contributions
Our contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We demonstrate that the Hyperbolic distance metric
satisfies dχ-privacy by providing a formal proof in the
Lorentz model of Hyperbolic space.
2) We define a probability distribution in Hyperbolic space
for getting noise values and also describe how to sample
from the distribution.
3) We evaluate our approach by preserving privacy against
an attribution algorithm, baselining against a Euclidean
model, and preserving utility on downstream systems.
II. PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
Consider a user interacting freely with an AI system via a
natural language interface. The user’s goal is to meet some
specific need with respect to an issued query x. The expected
norm in this specific context would be satisfying the user’s
request. A privacy violation occurs when x is used to make
personal inference beyond what the norm allows [21]. This
generally manifests in the form of unrestricted PII present in
x (including, but not restricted to locations, medical conditions
or personal preferences [8]). In many cases, the PII contains
more semantic information than what is required to address the
user’s base intent and the AI system can handle the request
without recourse to the explicit PII (we discuss motivating
examples shortly). Therefore, our goal is to output xˆ, a
semantic preserving redaction of x that preserves the user’s
objective while protecting their privacy. We approach this
privacy goal along two dimensions (described in Sec. VI):
(i) uncertainty – the adversary cannot base their guesses about
the user’s identity and property on information known with
certainty from x; and (ii) indistinguishability – the adversary
cannot distinguish whether an observed query xˆ was generated
by a given user’s query x, or another similar query x′.
To describe the privacy requirements and threat model,
we defer to the framework provided by [22]. First, we set
our privacy domain to be the non-interactive textual database
setting where we seek to release a sanitized database to an
internal team of analysts who can visually inspect the queries.
We also restrict this database to the one user, one query model
– i.e., for the baseline, we are not concerned with providing
protections on a user’s aggregate data. In this model, the
analyst is a required part of the system, thus, it is impossible
to provide semantic security where the analyst learns nothing.
This is only possible in a three-party cryptographic system
(e.g. under the Alice, Bob and Eve monikers) where the analyst
is different from the attacker (in our threat model, the analyst
is simultaneously Bob and Eve).
We address purely privacy issues by considering that the
data was willingly made available by the user in pursuit of
a specific objective (as opposed to security issues [23] where
the user’s data might have been stolen). Therefore, we posit
that the user’s query x is published and observable data. Our
overall aim is to protect the user from identity and property
inference i.e., given x, the analyst should neither be able
to infer with certainty, the user’s identity, nor some unique
property of the user.
A. Motivating examples
To illustrate the desired functionality, which is to infer the
user’s high level objective while preserving privacy, let us
consider the examples in Tab. I from the Snips dataset [24]:
Intent Sample query New word
GetWeather will it be colder in ohio (that) state
PlayMusic play techno on lastfm music; app
BookRestaurant book a restaurant in milladore (the) city
RateBook rate the firebrand one of 6 stars product
SearchCreativeWork i want to watch manthan (a) movie
TABLE I: Examples from the Snips dataset
In the examples listed, the underlined terms correspond to the
well defined notion of ‘slot values’ while the other words are
known as the ‘carrier phrase’. The slot values are essentially
‘variables’ in queries which can take on different values and
are identified by an instance type. We observe therefore that,
replacing the slot value with a new word along the similarity
or hierarchical axis does not change the user’s initial intent.
As a result we would expect xˆ = ‘play (music, song) from
app’ to be classified in the same way as x = ‘play techno
on lastfm’. We are interested in protecting the privacy of one
user, issuing one query, while correctly classifying the user’s
intent. This model is not designed to handle multiple queries
from a user, neither is it designed for handling exact queries
e.g. booking the ‘specific restaurant in milladore’.
Our objective is to create a privacy preserving mechanism
M that can carry out these slot transformations xˆ =M(x) in
a principled way, with a quantifiable notion of privacy loss.
III. PRIVACY MECHANISM OVERVIEW
In this section we review dχ-privacy as a generalization of
DP over metric spaces. Next, we introduce word embeddings
as a natural vector space for dχ-privacy over text. Then, we
give an overview of the privacy algorithm in Euclidean space,
and finish by discussing why Hyperbolic embeddings would
be a better candidate for the privacy task.
A. Broadening privacy over metric spaces
Our requirement warrants a privacy metric that confers
uncertainty via randomness to an observing adversary while
providing indistinguishability on the user inputs and mecha-
nism outputs. Over the years, DP [4] has been established as
mathematically well-founded definition of privacy. It mathe-
matically guarantees that an adversary observing the result of
an analysis will make essentially the same inference about any
user’s information, regardless of whether the user’s data is or
is not included as an input to the analysis. Formally, DP is
defined on adjacent datasets x and x′ that differ in at most
a single row, i.e., the Hamming distance between them is at
most 1 and which satisfy the following inequality: We say
that a randomized mechanism M : X → Y satisfies ε DP if
for any x, x′ ∈ X the distributions over outputs of M(x) and
M(x′) satisfy the following bound: for all y ∈ Y we have
Pr[M(x) = y]
Pr[M(x′) = y]
≤ eεd(x,x′) . (1)
where d(x, x′) is the Hamming distance and ε is the measure
of privacy loss. [14] generalized the classical definition of DP
by exploring other possible distance metrics which are suitable
where the Hamming distance is unable to capture the notion
of closeness between datasets (see Fig. 1 for other distance
metrics).
Fig. 1: Contour plots of different metrics [25]. Left to right:
L1 Manhattan distance, L2 Euclidean distance, L∞ Chebyshev
distance, Lp Minkowski distance (L3 shown here)
For example, a privacy model built using the Manhattan
distance metric can be used to provide indistinguishability
when the objective is to release the number of days from
a reference point [14]. Similarly, the Euclidean distance on
a 2d plane can be used to preserve privacy while releasing
a user’s longitude and latitude to mobile applications [15].
Finally, the Chebyshev distance can be adopted to to perturb
the readings of smart meters thereby preserving privacy on
what TV channels or movies are being watched [22].
In order to apply dχ-privacy to the text domain, first, we
need a way to organize words in a space equipped with an
appropriate distance metric. One way to achieve this is by
representing words using a word embedding model.
B. Word embeddings and their metric spaces
Word embeddings organize discrete words in a continuous
metric space such that their similarity in the embedding space
reflects their semantic or functional similarity. Word embed-
ding models like Word2Vec [26], GloVe [27], and fastText
[28] create such a mapping φ : W → Rn of a set of words
W into n-dimensional Euclidean space. The distance between
words is measured by the distance function d :W×W → R+.
This follows as d(w,w′) = d(φ(w), φ(w′)) = ‖φ(w)−φ(w)‖
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm on Rn. The vectors
φ(wi) are generally learned by proposing a conditional prob-
ability for observing a word given its context words or by
predicting the context giving the original word in a large text
corpus [26].
C. The privacy mechanism in Euclidean space
Our dχ-privacy algorithm is similar to the model introduced
by [29] for privacy preserving text analysis, and [30] for
author obfuscation. The algorithms are all analogous to that
originally proposed by [13] and we describe it here using the
Euclidean distance for word embedding vectors. In the ensuing
sections, we will justify the need to use embedding models
trained in Hyperbolic space (Sec. III-D) while highlighting the
changes required to make the algorithm work in such space.
This includes the Hyperbolic word embeddings in Sec. V-E,
describing the noise distribution in Sec. V-B, and how to
sample from it in Sec. V-C
Algorithm 1: Privacy Mechanism
Input: string x = w1w2 · · ·w`, privacy parameter ε > 0
1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , `} do
2 Word embedding φi = φ(wi)
3 Sample noise N with density pN (~z) ∝ exp(−ε‖~z‖)
4 Perturb embedding with noise φˆi = φi +N
5 Discretization wˆi = argminu∈W ‖φ(u)− φˆi‖
6 Insert wˆi in ith position of xˆ
7 release xˆ
D. The case for Hyperbolic space
Even though Euclidean embeddings can model semantic
similarity between discrete words in continuous space, they are
not well attuned to modeling the latent hierarchical structure of
words which are required for our use case. To better capture se-
mantic similarity and hierarchical relationships between words
(without exponentially increasing the dimensionality of the
embeddings), recent works [18], [19], [31] propose learning
the vector representation in Hyperbolic space φ : W → Hn.
Unlike the Euclidean model, the Hyperbolic model can realize
word hierarchy through the norms of the word vectors and
word similarity through the distance between word vectors
(see Eqn. 2). Apart from hypernymy relationships (e.g., LONDON
→ ENGLAND), Hyperbolic embeddings can also model multiple
latent hierarchies for a given word (e.g., LONDON → LOCATION
and LONDON → CITY). Capturing these IS-A relationships (or
concept hierarchies) using Hyperbolic embeddings was re-
cently demonstrated by [32] using data from large text corpora.
Furthermore, for Euclidean models such as [29], [30], the
utility degrades badly as the privacy guarantees increase. This
is because the noise injected (line 4 of Alg. 1) increases to
match the privacy guarantees, resulting in words that are not
semantically related to the initial word. The space defined by
Hyperbolic geometry (Sec IV), in addition to the distribution
of words as concept hierarchies does away with this problem
while preserving privacy and utility of the user’s query.
IV. HYPERBOLIC SPACE AND GEOMETRY
Hyperbolic space Hn is a homogeneous space with con-
stant negative curvature [17]. The space exhibits hyperbolic
geometry, characterized by a negation of the parallel postulate
with infinite parallel line passing through a point. It is thus
distinguished from the other two isotropic spaces: Euclidean
Rn, with zero (flat) curvature; and spherical Sn, with constant
positive curvature. Hyperbolic spaces cannot be embedded iso-
metrically into Euclidean space, therefore embedding results
in every point being a saddle point. In addition, the growth
of the hyperbolic space area is exponential (with respect to
the curvature K and radius r), while Euclidean space grows
polynomially (see Tab. II for a summary of both spaces).
Property Euclidean Hyperbolic
Curvature K 0 < 0
Parallel lines 1 ∞
Triangles are normal thin
Sum of 4 angles pi < pi
Circle length 2pir 2pi sinh ζr
Disk area 2pir2/2 2pi (cosh ζr − 1)
TABLE II: Properties of Euclidean and hyperbolic geometries.
Parallel lines is the number of lines parallel to a line and that
go through a point not on this line, and ζ =
√|K| [17]
As a result of the unique characteristics of hyperbolic
space, it can be constructed with different isomorphic models.
These include: the Klein model, the Poincare´ disk model, the
Poincare´ half-plane model, and the Lorentz (or hyperboloid)
model. In this paper, we review two of the models: the Lorentz
model, and the Poincare´ model. We also highlight what unique
properties we leverage in each model and how we can carry
out transformations across them.
A. Poincare´ ball model
The n−dimensional Poincare´ ball Bn is a model of hyper-
bolic space Hn where all the points are mapped within the
n−dimensional open unit ball i.e., Bn = {x ∈ Rn| ‖x‖ < 1}
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. The boundary of the ball
i.e., the hypersphere Sn−1 is not part of the hyperbolic
space, but it represents points that are infinitely far away
(see Fig. 2a). The Poincare´ ball is a conformal model of
hyperbolic space (i.e., Euclidean angles between hyperbolic
lines in the model are equal to their hyperbolic values) with
metric tensor: gp(x) = [2/(1 − ‖x‖2)]2 ge 1 where x ∈ Bn
and ge is the Euclidean metric tensor. The Poincare´ ball model
then corresponds to the Riemannian manifold Pn = (Bn, gp).
Considering that the unit ball represents the infinite hyperbolic
space, we introduce a distance metric by: dρ = 2dr/(1− r2)
where ρ is the Poincare´ distance and r is the Euclidean
distance from the origin. Consequently, the growth in distance
dρ → ∞ as r → 1, which proves the infinite extent of the
ball. Therefore, given 2 points (e.g. representing word vectors)
u, v ∈ Bn we define the isometric invariant: [33]
δ(u, v) = 2
‖u− v‖2
(1− ‖u‖2)(1− ‖v‖2)
then the distance function over Pn is given by:
d(u, v) = arcosh(1 + δ(u, v))
= arcosh
(
1 + 2
‖u− v‖2
(1− ‖u‖2)(1− ‖v‖2)
)
(2)
The main advantage of this model is that it is conformal -
as a result, earlier research into Hyperbolic word embeddings
have leveraged on this model [31], [34], [35]. Furthermore,
there were existing artifacts such as the Poincare´ embeddings
by [18] built with this model that we could reuse for this work.
1The metric tensor (like a dot product) gives local notions of length and
angle between tangent vectors. By integration local segments, the metric tensor
allows us to calculate the global length of curves in the manifold
B. Lorentz model
The Lorentz model (also known as the hyperboloid or
Minkowski model) is a model of hyperbolic space Hn in which
points are represented by the points on the surface of the upper
sheet of a two-sheeted hyperboloid in (n + 1)-dimensional
Minkowski space. It is a combination of n−dimensional
spatial Euclidean coordinates xki for k = 1, 2, ..., n; and a
time coordinate x0i > 0. Therefore, given points u, v ∈ Rn+1,
the Lorentzian inner product (Minkowski bilinear form) is:
〈u, v〉L = −u0v0 +
n∑
i=1
uivi (3)
The product of a point with itself is −1, thus, we can compute
the norm as ‖x‖L =
√〈x, x〉L. We define the Lorentz model
as a Riemannian manifold Ln = (Hn, gl) where: Hn = {u ∈
Rn+1 : 〈u, v〉L = −1, u0 > 0} and the metric tensor gl =
diag(+1,−1, ...,−1). Hence, given the vector representation
of a word at the origin in Euclidean space Rn as [0, 0, ...0],
the word’s corresponding vector location in the Hyperboloid
model Rn+1 is [1, 0, ..., 0] where the first coordinate x0 for
x = (x0, x
′) ∈ Rn+1 is:
x0 ∈ Hn =
√
1 + ‖x′‖2 where x′ = (x1, ..., xn) (4)
The hyperbolic distance function admits a simple expression
in Ln and it is given as:
dl(u, v) = arcosh
(−〈u, v〉L) (5)
This distance function satisfies the axioms of a metric space
(i.e. identity of indiscernibles, symmetry and the triangle
inequality). Its simplicity and satisfaction of the axioms make
it the ideal model for constructing our privacy proof.
C. Connection between the models
Both models essentially describe the same structure of hy-
perbolic space characterized by its constant negative curvature.
They simply represent different coordinate charts in the same
metric space. Therefore, the Lorentz and Poincare´ model can
be related by a diffeomorphic transformation that preserves
all the properties of the geometric space, including isometry.
From Fig. 2c, we observe that a point xP in the Poincare´
model is a projection from the point xL = (x0, x′) in the
Lorentz model, to the hyperplane x0 = 0 by intersecting
it with a line drawn through [−1, 0, ..., 0]. Consequently, we
can map this point across manifolds from the Lorentz to the
Poincare´ model via the transformation xP : Ln → Pn where:
xP =
x′
1 + x0
where x′ = (x1, ..., xn) (6)
In this work, we only require transformations to the Poincare´
model i.e., using Eqn. 4 and 6. Mapping points back from
Poincare´ to Lorentz is done via:
xL = (x0, x′) =
(1 + ‖x‖2 , 2x)
1− ‖x‖2
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: (a) Tiling a square and triangle in the Poincare´ disk B2 such that all line segments have identical hyperbolic length. (b)
The forward sheet of a two-sheeted hyperboloid in the Lorentz model. (c) Projection [33] of a point in the Lorentz model Hn
to the Poincare´ model Bn (d) Embedding WebIsADb IS-A relationships in the GloVe vocabulary into the B2 Poincare´ disk
As a result of the equivalence of the models, in this paper, we
adopt the Lorentz model for constructing our dχ-privacy proof
while the word embeddings were trained in the Poincare´ ball
model. Consequently, the Poincare´ model is also used as the
basis for sampling noise from a high dimensional distribution
to provide the privacy and semantic guarantees.
V. PRIVACY PROOF AND SAMPLING MECHANISM
In this section, we provide the proof of dχ-privacy for
Hyperbolic space embeddings. We will be using the Lorentz
model of [19] rather than the Poincare´ model proposed in [18].
Then in Sec. V-B, we introduce our probability distribution for
adding noise (line 4 of Alg. 1) to the word embedding vectors.
Finally, we describe how to sample (line 3 of Alg. 1) from
the proposed distribution in Sec. V-C. We note that whereas
the privacy proof is provided in the Lorentz model, the noise
distribution and the embeddings are in the Poincare´ model. See
Sec. IV-C for discussions on the equivalence of the models.
A. dχ-privacy proof
In this section, we will show dχ-privacy for the Hyper-
boloid embeddings of [19]. In the following, given u, v ∈
Rn+1, we use the Lorentzian inner product from Eqn 3 i.e.
〈u, v〉L = −u0v0 +
∑n
i=1 uivi. The space (Hn, d), where
d(u, v) = arcosh (−〈u, v〉L) ∈ [0,∞], is the hyperboloid
model of n-dimensional (real) hyperbolic space.
Lemma 1. If u, v ∈ Hn, then 〈u, v〉L ≤ −1 with equality
only if u = v.
Proof. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the Euclidean
inner product in Rn for the first inequality and a simple
calculation for the second, we have:
(
n∑
i=1
uivi
)2
=
(
n∑
i=1
u2i
)(
n∑
i=1
v2i
)
from Cauchy-Schwarz, then
〈u, v〉L = −u0v0 +
n∑
i=1
uivi ≤ −u0v0 +
√√√√ n∑
i=1
u2i
√√√√ n∑
i=1
v2i
= −u0v0 +
√
u20 − 1
√
v20 − 1 ≤ −1
Any line through the origin intersects Hn in at most one point,
so Cauchy’s inequality is an equality if and only if u = v (as
a consequence of using the positive roots).
Now, as was the case for the Euclidean metric, we can use
the triangle inequality for the metric d which implies that for
any z ∈ Rn we have the following inequality:
exp (−εd(z, φ(w))) = exp (−εd(z, φ(w)))
exp (−εd(z, φ(w′))) exp
(−εd(z, φ(w′)))
= exp
(
εd(z, φ(w′))− εd(z, φ(w))
)
× exp
(
− εd(z, φ(w′))
)
= exp
[
ε arcosh
(− 〈z, φ(w′)〉L)− ε arcosh(− 〈z, φ(w)〉L )
]
× exp (−εd(z, φ(w′))
<= exp
(
ε arcosh
(〈
φ(w), φ(w′)
〉
L
))
exp
(
− εd(z, φ(w′)
)
= exp
(
εd
(
φ(w), φ(w′)
) )
exp
(
− εd(z, φ(w′)
)
Thus, as before by plugging the last two derivations together
and observing the the normalization constants in pN (z) and
pφ(w)+N (z) are the same, we obtain:
Pr[M(w) = wˆ]
Pr [M (w′) = wˆ]
=
∫
Cwˆ
exp(−ε 〈z, φ(w)〉L)dz∫
Cwˆ
exp
(−ε 〈z, φ(w′)〉L) dz
≤ exp (εd (w,w′))
Thus, for l = 1 the mechanism M is εdχ-privacy preserving.
The proof for l > 1 is identical to the Euclidean case of [29].
B. Probability distribution for sampling noise
In this section we describe the Hyperbolic distribution from
which we sample our noise perturbations. One option was
sampling from the Hyperbolic normal distribution proposed
by [36] (discussed in [37] and [38]) with pdf:
p(x|µ, σ) = 1
Z(σ)
e
d2(x,µ)
2σ2 and Z(σ) = 2pi
√
pi
2
σe
σ2
2 erf
(
σ√
2
)
However, our aim was to sample from the family of General-
ized Hyperbolic distributions which reduce to the Laplacian
distribution at particular location and scale parameters. By
taking this approach, we can build on the proof proposed in
the Euclidean case of dχ-privacy where noise was sampled
from a planar Laplace distribution [13], [14].
In the Poincare´ model of Hyperbolic spaces, we have the
following distance function defined in Eqn 2:
d(u, v) = arcosh
(
1 + 2
‖u− v‖2
(1− ‖u‖2)(1− ‖v‖2)
)
Now, analogous to the Euclidean distance used for the Laplace
distribution, we wish to construct a distribution that matches
this distance function. This will take the form:
p(x|µ, ε) ∝ (−εd(x, µ))
= exp
(
−ε arcosh
(
1 + 2
‖x− µ‖2
(1− ‖x‖2)(1− ‖µ‖2)
))
In all cases, our noise will be centered at x, and hence µ = 0:
p(x|µ = 0, ε) = 1
Z
exp (−εd(x, 0))
=
1
Z
exp
[
− ε arcosh
(
1 + 2
‖x‖2
(1− ‖x‖2)
)]
Next, we set a new variable c and observe:
c =
‖x‖2
(1− ‖x‖2) and arcosh(1 + 2c) = log
(
2c+ 2
√
c2 + c+ 1
)
p(x|µ = 0, ε) = 1
Z
exp
[
− ε log
(
1 + 2c+
√
(1 + 2c)2 − 1
)]
Reinserting the variable c and simplifying
=
1
Z
exp
[
− ε log
(
− 2‖x‖ − 1 − 1
)]
=
1
Z
(
− 2‖x‖ − 1 − 1
)−ε
The normalization constant is then:
Z =
∫ 1
−1
(
− 2‖x‖ − 1 − 1
)−ε
dx
=
2 2F1(1, ε, 2 + ε,−1)
1 + ε
where 2F1(a, b; c, z) is the hypergeometric function defined
for |z| < 1 by the power series
2F1(a, b; c; z) =
∞∑
n=0
(a)n(b)n
(c)n
zn
n!
.
where (z)n =
Γ(z+n)
Γ(z) is the Pochhammer symbol (rising
factorial). Note that Z does not depend on x, and hence can be
computed in closed form a-priori. Our distribution is therefore:
p(x|µ = 0, ε) = 1 + ε
2 2F1(1, ε, 2 + ε,−1)
(
− 2‖x‖ − 1 − 1
)−ε
(7)
The result shown in Fig. 3 for different values of ε illustrates
the PDF of the new distribution derived from Eqn. 7.
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Fig. 3: 1d PDF of Eqn. 7 at different values of ε
C. Sampling from the distribution
Since we are unable to sample directly from the high
dimensional hyperbolic distribution in Eqn. 7, we derive
sampled points by simulating random walks over it using
the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm. A similar approach
was adopted by [37] and [38] to sample points from high
dimensional Riemannian normal distributions using Monte
Carlo samples. We start with f(x, ε) which is our desired
probability distribution as defined in Eqn. 7 where ε is the
dχ-privacy parameter. Then we choose a starting point x0 to
be the first sample. The point x0 is set at the origin of the
Poincare´ model (see Fig. 2c). The sample x0 is then updated
as the current point xt.
To select the next candidate x′t, MH requires the point be
sampled ideally from a symmetric distribution g such that
g(xt|x′t) = g(x′t|xt) for example, a Gaussian distribution
centered at xt. To achieve this, we sampled x′t from the
multivariate normal distribution in Euclidean space, centered at
xt. The sampled point xt is then translated to the Hn Lorentz
model in Rn+1 dimensional Minkowski space by setting the
first coordinate using Eqn. 4. The Lorentz coordinates are then
converted to the Bn Poincare´ model in Rn Hyperbolic space
using Eqn. 6. Therefore, the final coordinates of the sampled
point xt is in the Poincare´ model.
Next, for every MH iteration, we calculate an acceptance
ratio α = f(x′t, ε)/f(xt, ε) with our privacy parameter ε. If
α is less than a uniform random number u ∼ U([0, 1]), we
accept the sampled point by setting xt+1 = x′t (and sample
the next point centered at this new point), otherwise, we reject
the sampled point by setting xt+1 to the old point xt.
Algorithm 2: Hyperbolic Noise Sampling Mechanism
Input: dimension n > 0, µ = 0, privacy parameter ε > 0
Result: k results from Bn
1 Let f(x, ε) be the Hyperbolic noise distribution in n dimensions
2 set x0 = [1, 0, ..., 0]
3 set xt = x0
4 set b as the initial sample burn-in period
5 while i < k + b do
6 sample x′ ∼ N (xt,Σ)
7 translate x′ →Hn → Bn
8 compute α = f(x′)/f(xt)
9 sample u ∼ U [(0, 1)]
10 if u ≤ α then
11 accept sample
12 set xt+1 = x′
13 else
14 reject sample
15 set xt+1 = xt
16 release xni , ..., x
n
k
D. Ensuring numerical stability
Sampling in high dimensional Hyperbolic spaces comes
with numeric stability issues [18], [19], [37]. This occurs
as the curvature and dimensionality of the space increases.
This leads to points being consistently sampled at an infinite
distance from the mean. Using an approach similar to [18],
we constrain the updated vector to remain within the Poincare´
ball by updating the noisy vectors as:
proj(θ) =
{
θ/ ‖θ‖ · (1 + λ), if ‖θ‖ ≥ 1
θ, otherwise
where λ is a small constant. This occurs as a post-processing
step and therefore does not affect the dχ-privacy proof. In our
experiments, we set the value to be λ = 10e−5 as in [18].
E. Poincare´ embeddings for our analysis
The geometric structure of the Poincare´ embeddings repre-
sent the metric space over which we provide privacy guaran-
tees. By visualizing the embeddings in the Poincare´ disk (see
Fig. 4), we observe that higher order concepts are distributed
towards the center of the disk, instances are found closer to the
perimeter, and similar words are equidistant from the origin.
In this work, we train the Poincare´ embeddings described in
[18]. To train, we use data from WEBISADB, a large database
of over 400 million hypernymy relations extracted from the
CommonCrawl web corpus. We narrowed the dataset by only
selecting relations of words (i.e., both the instance and the
class) that occurred in the GLOVE vocabulary. To ensure we
had high quality data, we further restricted the data to links
that had been found at least 10 times in the CommonCrawl
corpus. Finally, we filtered out stop words, offensive words
and outliers (words with ≤ 2 links) from the dataset, resulting
in ≈ 126, 000 extracted IS-A relations. We use the final dataset
to train a 100−dimension Poincare´ embedding model. We use
this model for all our analysis and experiments.
Fig. 4: Embedding WebIsADb IS-A relationships in the GloVe
vocabulary into the B2 Poincare´ disk
VI. PRIVACY CALIBRATION
In this section, we describe our approach for calibrating the
values of ε for a given mechanism M . For all our discussions,
M(w) = w means the privacy mechanism M returns the same
word, while M(w) = wˆ represents a different random word
from the algorithm. We now define the privacy guarantees
that result in uncertainty for the adversary over the outputs
of M(w), and indistinguishability over the inputs to M(w).
A. Uncertainty statistics
The uncertainty of an adversary is defined over the prob-
ability of predicting the value of the random variable wˆ i.e.
Pr[M(w) = wˆ]. This follows from the definition of Shannon
entropy which is the number of additional bits required by the
adversary to reveal the user’s identity or some secret property.
However, even though entropy is a measure of uncertainty,
there are issues with directly adopting it as a privacy metric
[22] since it is possible to construct different probability
distributions with the same level of entropy.
Nevertheless, we still resort to defining the uncertainty
statistics by using the two extremes of the Re´nyi entropy
[39]. The Hartley entropy H0 is the special case of Re´nyi
entropy with α = 0. It depends on vocabulary size |W| and
is therefore a best-case scenario as it represents the perfect
privacy scenario for a user as the number of words grow. It
is given by H0 = log2 |W|. Min-entropy H∞ is the special
case with α = ∞ which is a worst-case scenario because it
depends on the adversary attaching the highest probability to a
specific word p(w). It is given by H∞ = − log2 max
w∈W
(p(w)).
We now describe proxies for the Hartley and Min-entropy.
First, we observe that the mechanism M(w) at ε = (0,∞)
has full support over the entire vocabulary W . However,
empirically, the effective number of new words returned by
the mechanism M(w) over multiple runs approaches a finite
subset. As a result, we can expect that |Wˆ|ε→0 > |Wˆ|ε→∞ for
a finite number of successive runs of the mechanism M(w).
We define this effective number |Wˆ| at each value of ε for each
word as Sw. Therefore, our estimate of the Hartley entropy H0
becomes H0 = log2 |W| ≈ log2 Sw.
Similarly, we expect that over multiple runs of the mech-
anism M(w), as ε → ∞, the probability Pr[M(w) = w]
increases and approaches 1. As a result, we can expect that
Pr[M(w) = w]ε→0 < Pr[M(w) = w]ε→∞ for a finite number
of successive runs of the mechanism M(w). We define this
number Pr[M(w) = w] at each value of ε, and for each
word as Nw. Therefore, our estimate of the Min-entropy H∞
becomes H∞ = − log2 max
w∈W
(p(w)) ≈ − log2Nw.
We estimated the quantities Nw and Sw empirically by
running the mechanism M(w) 1, 000 times for a random
population (10, 000 words) of the vocabulary W at different
values of ε. The results are presented in Fig. 5a and 5b for
Nw and Fig. 5c for Sw.
B. Indistinguishability statistics
Indistinguishability metrics of privacy indicate denote the
ability of the adversary to distinguish between two items of
interest. dχ-privacy provides degrees of indistinguishability
of outputs bounded by the privacy loss parameter ε. For
example, given a query x = ‘send the package to London’,
corresponding outputs of xˆ = ‘send the package to England’
or ‘. . . to Britain’ provide privacy by output indistinguishability
for the user. This is captured as uncertainty over the number
of random new words as expressed in the Sw metric.
However, we also extend our privacy guarantees to in-
distinguishability over the inputs. For example, for an ad-
versary observing the output xˆ = ‘send the package to
England’, they are unable to infer the input x that created
the output xˆ because, for the permuted word wˆ = Eng-
land, the original word w could have been any member
of the set {w : ∀w ∈ Wˆ if w ≺ wˆ}, where a ≺ b
implies that a is lower than b in the embedding hierar-
chy. For example, {LONDON,MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM, . . .} ≺
{ENGLAND, BRITAIN, . . .}. Since this new statistic derives from
Sw, we expect it to vary across ε in the same manner. Hence,
we replace Wˆ with Sw and define the new statistic Kw as:
Kw = min |{w : ∀w ∈ Sw if w ≺ wˆ}|
This input indistinguishability statistic can be thought of for-
mally in terms of plausible deniability [20]. In [20], plausible
deniability states that an adversary cannot deduce that a partic-
ular input was significantly more responsible for an observed
output. This means, there exists a set of inputs that could have
generated the given output with about the same probability.
Therefore, given a vocabulary size |W| > k and mechanism
M such that wˆ =M(w1), we get k−indistinguishability over
the inputs with probability γ if there are at least k−1 distinct
words w2, ..., wk ∈ W \{d1} such that:
γ−1 ≤ Pr[M(wi)] = wˆ
Pr[M(wj)] = wˆ
≤ γ for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}
We also estimated the values of Kw empirically by running
the mechanism 1, 000 times for a random population (10, 000
words) of the vocabulary W at different values of ε. The
results are presented in Fig. 5d.
C. Selecting a value of ε
To set the value of ε for a given task, we propose following
the guidelines offered by [15] in the context of location
privacy by providing appropriate reformulations. They suggest
mapping ε to a desired radius of high protection within which,
all points have the same distinguishability level. We can
achieve a corresponding calibration using results in Fig. 5.
The worst-case guarantees highlighted by the upper bound
of the Nw statistic (see Fig. 5b) equips us with a way to fix
an equivalent ‘radius of high protection’. This ‘radius’ corre-
sponds to the upper bound on the probability Pr[M(w) = w]
which sets the guarantee on the likelihood of changing any
word in the embedding vocabulary. Consequently, the words
which are provided with the ‘same distinguishability level’
can be interpreted by the size of the results in Fig. 5c, and by
extension, Fig. 5d. In the following sections, we investigate
the impact of setting varying values of ε on the performance
of downstream ML models, and how the privacy guarantees
of our Hyperbolic model compares to the Euclidean baseline.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We carry out 3 experiments to illustrate the tradeoff between
privacy and utility. The first two are privacy experiments, while
the third is a set of utility experiments against ML tasks.
A. Evaluation metrics
• Author predictions: the number of authors that were re-
identified in a dataset. Lower is better for privacy.
• Nw: number of times (of 1, 000) where the mechanism
returned the original word. Lower is better for privacy.
• Accuracy: is the percentage of predictions the down-
stream model got right. Higher is better for utility
B. Privacy experiments I
In this section, we describe how we carried out privacy
evaluations using an approach similar to [30].
1) Task: The task is to carry out author obfuscation against
an authorship attribution algorithm.
(a) Nw average case
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Fig. 5: Privacy statistics – (a) Nw statistics: avg count of M(w) = w (b) Nw statistics: max count of M(w) = w (c) Sw
statistics: distinct outputs for M(w) (d) Kw statistics: count of different words |{w,w′}| which resolve to same output wˆ
2) Baselines: Just as in [30], the ‘adversarial’ attribution
algorithm is Koppel’s algorithm [40]. Evaluation datasets were
selected from the PAN@Clef tasks as follows:
• PAN11 [41] the small dataset contained 3, 001 documents
by 26 authors while the large set had 9, 337 documents
by 72 authors. Both were derived from the Enron emails.
• PAN12 [42] unlike the short email lengths per author
in PAN11, this dataset consisted of dense volumes per
author. Set-A had 3 authors with between 1, 800 and
6, 060 words; C and D had 8 authors with ≈ 13, 000
words each; while set-I consisted of 14 authors of novels
with word counts ranging between 40, 000 to 170, 000.
3) Experiment setup: We ran each dataset against Koppel’s
algorithm [40] to get the baseline. Each dataset was then
passed through our dχ-privacy algorithm to get a new text
output. This was done line by line in a manner similar to
[30] i.e. all non stop words were considered. We evaluated
our approach at the following values of ε = 0.5, 1, 2 and 8.
4) Privacy experiment results: The results in Table III
show that our algorithm provides tunable privacy guarantees
against the authorship model. It also extends guarantees to
authors with thousands of words. As ε increases, the privacy
guarantees decrease as clearly evidenced by the PAN11 tasks.
We only show results for Kopell’s algorithm because other
evaluations perform worse on the baselines. e.g. PAN18 iden-
tifies only 65 and 50 authors, while PAN19-SVM identifies 54
and 35 authors in the PAN11 small and large datasets.
PAN-11 PAN-12
ε small large set-A set-C set-D set-I
0.5 36 72 4 3 2 5
1 35 73 3 3 2 5
2 40 78 4 3 2 5
8 65 116 4 5 4 5
∞ 147 259 6 6 6 12
TABLE III: Correct author predictions (lower is better)
C. Privacy experiments II
We now describe how we evaluate the privacy guarantees
of our Hyperbolic model against the Euclidean baseline.
1) Task and baselines: The objective was to compare
the expected privacy guarantees for our Hyperbolic vs. the
Euclidean baseline, given the same worst case guarantees. We
evaluated against 100d, 200d and 300d GloVe embeddings.
2) Experiment setup: We designed the dχ-privacy algo-
rithm in the Euclidean space as follows: (a) the embedding
model was GloVe, using the same vocabulary as in the
Poincare´ embeddings described in Sec. V-E; (b) we sampled
using the multivariate Laplacian distribution, by extending the
planar Laplacian in [13] using the technique in [29]; (c) we
calibrate Euclidean ε values by computing the privacy statistics
Nw for a given Hyperbolic ε value.
To run the experiment, we repeat the following for the
Hyperbolic and Euclidean embeddings: (1) first, we select
a value of ε, (2) we empirically compute the worst case
guarantee, i.e. the largest maximum number of times we get
any word max
w∈W
[M(w) = w] rather than selecting a new word
after our noise perturbation, (3) we compute the expected
guarantee, i.e. the average number of times we get all words
each time we perturb the word avg
w∈W
[M(w) = w].
3) Privacy experiment results: The results for the com-
parative privacy analysis are presented in Tab. IV. The results
clearly demonstrate that for identical worst case guarantees,
the expected case for the Hyperbolic model is significantly
better than the Euclidean across all Euclidean dimensions.
Combining this with the superior ability of the Hyperbolic
model to encode both similarity and hierarchy even at lower
dimensions provides a strong argument for adopting it as a
dχ-privacy preserving mechanism for the motivating examples
described in Sec. II-A.
expected value Nw
ε worst-case Nw HYP-100 EUC-100 EUC-200 EUC-300
0.125 134 1.25 38.54 39.66 39.88
0.5 148 1.62 42.48 43.62 43.44
1 172 2.07 48.80 50.26 53.82
2 297 3.92 92.42 93.75 90.90
8 960 140.67 602.21 613.11 587.68
TABLE IV: Privacy comparisons (lower Nw is better)
D. Utility experiments
Having established Hyperbolic embeddings as being better
than the Euclidean baseline for dχ-privacy, we now demon-
strate its effects on the utility of downstream models (i.e. we
conduct utility experiments only on Hyperbolic embeddings).
1) ML Tasks: we ran experiments on 8 tasks (5
classification and 3 natural language tasks) to highlight the
tradeoff between privacy and utility for a broad range of
tasks. See Tab. V for a summary of the tasks and datasets.
name samples task classes example(s)
MR [43] 10, 662 sentiment (movies) 2 neg, pos
CR [44] 3, 775 product reviews 2 neg, pos
MPQA [45] 10, 606 opinion polarity 2 neg, pos
SST-5 [46] 12, 000 sentiment (movies) 5 0
TREC-6 [47] 5, 452 question-type 6 LOC:city
SICK-E [48] 10, 000 natural language inference 3 contradiction
MRPC [49] 5, 801 paraphrase detection 2 paraphrased
STS14 [50] 4, 500 semantic textual similarity [0, 5] 4.6
TABLE V: Classification and natural language tasks
2) Task baselines: the utility results were baselined using
SentEval [51], an evaluation toolkit for sentence embeddings.
We evaluated the utility of our algorithm against an upper and
lower bound.
To set an upper bound on utility, we ran each task using the
original datasets. Each task was done on the following em-
bedding representations: (1) InferSent [52], (2) SkipThought
[53] and (3) fastText [28] (as an average of word vectors).
To set a lower bound on the utility scores, rather than
replacing words using our algorithm, we replaced them with
random words from the embedding vocabulary.
3) Experiment setup: unlike intent classification datasets
such as [24] and [54], most datasets do not come with ‘slot
values’ to be processed by a privacy preserving algorithm
(see motivating examples in Sec. II-A). As a result, we
pre-processed all the datasets to identify phrases with low
transition probabilities using the privacy preserving algorithm
proposed by [55].
The output from [55] yields a sequence of high frequency
sub-phrases. As a result, for every query in each dataset, we
are able to (inversely) select a set of low transition phrases
which act as slot values to be fed into our algorithm.
For a given dataset, the output from processing each query
using our algorithm is then fed into the corresponding task.
4) Utility experiment results: We evaluated our algorithm
at values of ε = 0.125, 1 and 8. Words were sampled from
the metric space defined by the 100d Poincare´ embeddings
described in Sec V-E.
The results are presented in Tab. VI. The evaluation metric
for all tasks was accuracy on the test set. Across all the
experiments, our algorithm yielded better results that just
replacing with random words. In addition, and as expected, at
lower values of ε = 0.125, we record lower values of utility
across all tasks. Conversely at the higher value of ε = 8,
the accuracy scores get closer to the baselines. All the results
illustrate the tradeoff between privacy and utility. It also shows
that we can achieve tunable privacy guarantees with minimal
impact on the utility of downstream ML models.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There are two sets of research most similar to ours. The
recent work by [29] and [30] applies dχ-privacy to text using
similar techniques to ours. However, their approach was done
in Euclidean space while ours used word representations in,
and noise sampled from Hyperbolic space. As a result, our
approach can better preserve semantics at smaller values of ε
by selecting hierarchical replacements.
The next set include research by [56], [57], and [58]. These
all work by identifying sensitive terms in a document and
replacing them by some generalization of the word. This is
similar to what happens when we sample from Hyperbolic
space towards the center of the Poincare´ ball to select a
hypernym of the current word. The difference between these
and our work is the mechanism for selecting the words and
the privacy model used to describe the guarantees provided.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper is the first to demonstrate how hierarchical word
representations in Hyperbolic space can be deployed to satisfy
dχ-privacy in the text domain. We presented a theoretical
proof of the privacy guarantees in addition to defining a
probability distribution for sampling privacy preserving noise
from Hyperbolic space. Our experiments illustrate that our
approach preserves privacy against an author attribution model
and utility on several downstream models. Compared to the
Euclidean baseline, we observe > 20x greater guarantees on
expected privacy against comparable worst case statistics. Our
results significantly advance the study of dχ-privacy, mak-
ing generalized differential privacy with provable guarantees
closer to practical deployment in the text domain.
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